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CONVERSION TABLE
The imperial system of weight, measurement and curtency in use during the period
covered by this thesis has been retained in the text. The metric and decimal equivalents of
the units used in the text are as follows:

1.

2.

Weight
Imperial Unit

Metric Equivalent

Ounce

28.4 grams

Pound

0.5 kilograms

Hundredweight

50.8 kilograms

Ton

1014.7 kilograms

Measurement
Imperial Unit

Metric Equivalent

Foot

30.5 centimetres

Yard

0.9 metres

Mile

1.6 kilometres

Imperial Unit

Decimal Equivalent*

Penny (Pence)

0.8 cents

ShUling

10 cents

Pound

2 dollars

Guinea

2 dollars & 10 cents

Currency

At the time of changeover to decimal cmxency, Febmary 1966
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The most glorious act of patriotism is that of buUding up the
district in which one's lot is cast; by deeds of self-sacrifice, acts
of goodness and generosity—severed from all selfishness,
irrespective of gain or reward, praise or censure. The noble
outiook—great consumation—far off though it may be—the
betterment of the present—tiie sunrise of hope—the radiant day
dawn of prosperity and content for aU; the new-bom created
future, fuU of golden wealth, stirs the soul of the patriot, and he
fives in the glorious sUvery future his noble mind has fashioned
up.
The Ulawarra or South Coast Tourist Guide. The South Coast
Tourist Union: Sydney 1903, p.7.

. . . it ties nearer the sea than it should . .. For a country to have
the sea nearby is pleasant enough for the purpose of everyday
life, but in fact it is a 'salty-sharp and bitter neighbour' in more
senses than one. It fUls the land with wholesaUng and retailing,
breeds shifty and deceitful habits in a man's soul, and makes the
citizens distmstful and hostUe, not only among themselves, but
also in their dealings with the world outside.
Plato, The Laws. Translated by T.J. Saunders. Penguin:
Harmondsworth, England 1975, p. 159.

INTRODUCTION
During the long economic boom that foUowed World War II the WoUongong district of
New South Wales emerged as a coal, iron and steel producer of world stature. Its population,
boosted to over 250,000 people by the labour demands of local industry, centred on the
government buUt deepwater harbour at Port Kembla, and the post war immigration programme,
made WoUongong one of AustraHa's largest cities. When the boom disintegrated and AustraUa,
in common with other advanced capitalist nations, began to undergo a process of
deindustrialisation, WoUongong faced a social and economic crisis. The iron and steel
industry, the district's largest employer, more than halved its workforce in the 1980s. The
local mines, most of which belonged to the same employer, the Broken HiU Proprietary, shared
a simUar fate.
In part this crisis arose from the decision of some third world countries to restmcture
the international steel economy by offering incentives to Westem investors for the establishment
of up to date steel plants, giving these countries the highest quality product far more cheaply
than that offered to them by the high wage producers of Europe, America and AustraUa. The
Broken HUl Proprietary now found cheaper, perhaps better, steel confironting it in world and
AustraUan markets. It responded by modernising its plant, to improve productivity and
profitabiUty. The shedding of labour assisted those objectives. Consequentiy, WoUongong's
small businesses suffered as pay packets were replaced increasingly with unemployment
benefits.
International market forces, arising from decisions made many thousands of miles from
WoUongong, had ended not only 30 years of uninterrapted material prosperity and security.
The crisis was yet more profound than that It had destabUised the local economy, weakening
the very foundation of that prosperity—the market position and thus the employment and wage
generating capacity of mining and manufacturing. Mining had been the mainstay of
WoUongong's economy since the mid 1880s, supplemented and then largely supplanted by iron
and steel manufacturingfix»mthe 1920s.

The local business community, aware of the impact rather than the nature and causes of
the downturn, called for greater diversity in the district's economy. An economy resting on
essentially one industry, said its leaders, was bound to bring disaster. This was a new idea for
WoUongong. Since the mid nineteenth century its businessmen had promoted consistentiy,
indeed obsessively, the notion that the district's destiny was linked indissolubly to mining and
metal manufacturing. Wollongong was in their view fated to become 'the Black Country of
New South Wales' or 'the Birmingham of the South'. These men made Wollongong a
company town where, in the good years, the slogan 'What's good for BHP is good for
WoUongong' became a truism.
However, by the 1980s, tiie owners of national and international capital had decided
that that phase of WoUongong's history was coming to a close. The district's businessmen
responded in two ways. First, not fully realising that industriaUsation in WoUongong had
passed its peak, they sought to render the place more attractive to manufacturing capital. They
embarked on a programme to reverse its image as a district divided by inappropriate class
loyalties. In their view this was the major deterrent to potential investors who were unwiUing
torisktheir capital in a centre of union militancy. The co-operation of workers and their unions"
was sought to send a message to the outside world that WoUongong had discarded its
nineteenth century industrial attitudes. Reports and rumours abounded of the pent up
investment waiting to flow into the area once this became more generaUy known. Everything
rangingfi-omfishcanneries to 'high tech' aerospace component manufacturers was canvassed.
None of it eventuated, and WoUongong's business leaders tumed to their second response.
This mvolved the erasure of WoUongong's other image as a colourless industrial town,
ingrained in the local and national consciousness by near 130 years of unrelenting labour,
begun by the businessmen's nineteenth century ancestors, to produce just that result. UntU the
1980s clouds of dust from the coal stockpUes at the steelworks and plumes of smoke rising
from its smokestacks were interpreted less as poUution than as signs that aU was weU with
WoUongong.
Throughout the 1980s, ably led by the Lord Mayor, a real estate agent and earthmoving
contractor, local businessmen launched a policy of 'greening the city'. Elected to represent

Wollongong in the State Parliament, the Mayor devoted considerable effort to promoting the
new image that he and his colleagues were constmcting. With the possibiUty of diversifying
the local economy's manufacturing base looking ever more remote, WoUongong's potential as a
tourist destination took centre place in their thinking. HighUghting the district's relatively
unspoiled beaches, its forested escarpment and the siurounding dairy farming region, they
estabUshed a high profile tourist information centte and gave the district a new name—the
Leisure Coast. WoUongong's destiny was being rewritten, with the skyline of the New
Jemsalem to be dominated by hotels, convention centtes and high rise beachside apartment
blocks in place of factories, smokestacks and stockpiled coal. Some tourist capital has made its
way into the district, creating some employment, though mainly of a seasonal, part time and
casual nature. Wliether such a poUcy wiU ever fully offset the impact of losing near 20,000 fuU
time jobs in the mining and manufacturing industries, and induce an econonoic renaissance in
WoUongong remains to be seen. As this thesis wiU demonstrate, the deUberate engineering of
regional economic change is no simple undertaking. Powerful individuals, institutions and
forces outside the district, and beyond the control of its inhabitants and tiieir leaders, exert far
more influence over its destiny than can tiiose working from the inside. Some create contexts,'
others must work within them.
Within their limits, though, WoUongong's business leaders have shown a real capacity
to mould the attitudes, expectations and aspirations of the local popitiation. In both the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as they worked first to move their economy from a
dependence on agriculture and dairying to mining and manufacturing, and then from the latter to
tourism and conventions, probably their single greatest success lay in the restracturing of the
minds of that population. In the 1980s the aim of this was to imbue individuals with tiie notion
that WoUongong's industrial phase was dead and must now be buried. The district's
newspaper, the Ulawarra Mercury, its two radio stations and its television broadcaster took up
the challenge. They ran extensive campaigns promoting WoUongong's new future as the
Leisure Coast and substituting the language and images of community for those of class.
SimUarly, residents were fed media images designed to have them think of the district in terms
of the natural beauty of tiie surrounding region. AU of tins, it was beUeved, would set tiie seal

on WoUongong's new, post industrial image. This was vital. Since the district's business
community was also pressing the New Soutii Wales and Commonwealth governments to
provide pubUc money for the improvement of road, rati and port facUities, it was important that
tiiey were able to indicate some evidence of new community attitudes and expectations which,
they asserted, gave them a claim on the public purse."'
The point of it aU was that local business people required another means of extracting a
profit from the district. Having reaUsed that their district was entering a phase of industrial
decUne, rather than experiencing a cyclical economic downturn, they took control of local
public poUcy in an attempt to restmcmre WoUongong's economy. At the heart of that effort
was the beUef that this would be achieved only if WoUongong was in some way made attractive
to national and international capital. Then- aim, their motives and their methods were precisely
those of their nineteenth century forebears. That coalition of shopkeepers, newspaper
proprietors, providers of professional and commercial services, self employed tradesmen,
landowners and others, had decided in the 1850s that their only hope of a constantiy rising level
of material prosperity was to move die local economy away from farming to mining and, in tiie
longer term, to manufacturing. The single greatest obstacle to the achievement of that goal was
the absence of a natural harbour in the WoUongong distria.
Wollongong lies on the east coast of AustraUa about 50 mUes south of Sydney, the
capital of New South Wales. Its surrounding district, sometimes referted to loosely as
Ulawarta, the larger region of which tiie district is a part,2 (see Map following) is defined in the
west by the Ulawarra escarpment, some 1200-1300 feet high, and in the east by the Pacific
Ocean, Between the two mns the WoUongong peneplain, about 12 miles wide at the coastal
viUage of SheUharbour, marking the soutiiem end of tiie district, and receding graduaUy untU it
merges with the escarpment and the ocean at Coalcliff, a littie under 25 miles north of

The preceding account of the impact of the end of the post war boom in Wollongong, and the response to
it of the local business community, is the author's interpretation of those years, drawn from the
experience of having lived through and taken a close interest in it Sources which confirm it are: J.

Schultz, Steel City Blues. Penguin: Ringwood, Victoria 1985, and Four Corners: 'The Callous Country
Australian Broadcasting Corporation 1991 (first broadcast on ABC TV, 18 November 1991). See also L.
Richardson, The Bitter Years: Wollongong During the Great Depression. Hale & Iremonger. Sydney
1984, Chapter 1 ('The birth of a steeltown').
The niawarra region comprises the area between the Port Hacking River, about 16 miles south of Sydney,
and the Shoalhaven River, some 40 miles south of Wollongong. Bounded by the niawarra Range in the
west and the Pacific Ocean in the east, the region may be said to contain three districts: Wollongong;
Kiama, centred on the coastal town of Kiama, 20 miles south of Wollongong, and Shoalhaven.

•THE ILLAWAJ^RA REGION
Wollongong, Kiama and Shoalhaven Districts

ESaETCOCEaK

SheUharbour. Three namral features dominate tiie area around Wollongong: Lake Ulawarra,
with its 22 square mUe sheet of water just five imles south of the town, which on a map appears
the obvious site for a harbour but is in fact relatively shaUow and cut from the sea by dunes and
sandbanks;^ and Mounts Kembla and Keira, the former six mUes soutii west of WoUongong
and the latter a few miles directly behind the town, both rising over 1500 feet above the plain.
Coal had been discovered in the district in 1797 by the survivors of a shipwreck but, for
reasons explained in Chapter 1, no real attempt to mine it was undertaken untU 1849. Instead,
WoUongong's place in the economy of mid nineteenth century New South Wales was secured
by the quality of its dairy produce, particularly its butter. As Joseph Gorden, a visiting and
deservedly minor English poet, was moved to observe in his 'WoUongong and Ulawarra' of
1861:
This fact, e'er since I crossed the seas,
I rarely fail at meals to utter
That Bathurst stands unmatched for cheese.
And WoUongong for yellow butter.'*
That reality and its cortesponding image remained good untU the mid/late 1880s, from which
time WoUongong's economy responded less to the price fetched by a pound of butter in Sydney_
than to tiie demand for coal in Sydney and the markets of the Asia-Pacific region. By the late
1880s the Wollongong district was firmly estabUshed, behind tiie Newcastie coalfield 100 mUes
north of Sydney, as the second largest coal producer in tiie AustraUan Colonies, accounting for
one fifth to a quarter of New South Wales output and about one quarter of exports to overseas
markets.^ The new coal economy brought growtii. Between die censuses of 1851 and 1891
tiie district's population rose by 333 per cent, from 3099 to 13,420,® the buUc of which
depended on coal mining for its UveUhood.
This tiiesis seeks to explain tiiat transformation by asking the question, 'Why was a coal
trade established in tiie WoUongong district of New South Wales in the second half of tiie

3
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See R.W. Young & AJI.M. Johnson, 'The Physical Setting: Environmental Hazards and Urban
Planning'. In R. Robinson (Ed.), Urban Ulawarra. Sorrett Publishing: Melbourne 1977, p.38.
J. Gordon, Botany Bay and Other Poems. Arthur HaU, Virtue & Co.: London 1861.
Calculated from figures in Annual Report of the Department of Mines, New South Wales. 1885-1889.
See also Appendix 2 to this thesis: 'The Wollongong Coalfield: Exports and Production, 1875-1889'.
Calculated from 'New South Wales Census—1851'. In Supplement to the New South Wales
Government Gazette, No.l28.7 November 1851, and Residts of a Census of New South Wales Taken fo
the Night of 31st March, 1901. Government Printer Sydney 1904.

nineteenth century?' The direction of the argument derives from answers to five subsidiary
questions: who wanted this change to occur, why, how did tiiey go about it, to what extent did
they succeed, and who was responsible for that success?
Three groups were involved in the process: the local business community, the coal
companies and the government of New South Wales. Of the three only the first actuaUy wished
to transform the local economy and developed a clear poHcy to that end. Its centrepiece was the
procuring for WoUongong of a large, safe, deep and weU equipped coal port. In the absence of
such a port WoUongong coal had to be taken to Sydney in smaU coastal sailing vessels, where it
would be loaded onto larger vessels for transhipment to intercolonial and overseas destinations.
This doublehandUng added to the cost of the coal and caused some deterioration in its quality.
Although it was more easily and, therefore, cheaply won than Newcastie coal, these
disadvantages did not aUow the southern coal to compete as effectively as the latter could for
market shares.
WhUe such factors provided a rational economic basis for the businessmen's policy,
that policy was at heart a cargo cult approach to local development. Their central belief,
reiterated time and again, was that if WoUongong possessed a decent port then mining
capitaUsts would msh to invest in the coalfield. Odd though it may sound for businessmen, the
state of demand for coal had Uttie impact on their single minded pursuit of their goal. So
obsessed were they with the potential offered by a coal trade for gaining access to the pay
packets of an increasing number of regularly paid workers, that they refiised to abandon their
poUcy no matter what the obstacles. Only once, in 1870, foUowing two short but deep
recessions, did tiiey waver and lose direction.
Regardless of their ambitions, the businessmen of WoUongong required someone to
spend a considerable sum of money for the constmction, equipping and maintenance of a coal
port. Provincial shopkeepers neither possessed nor had access to that kind of money, and no
other owners of private capital came forward to provide it. Consequentiy, the businessmen
designated the matter a 'pubUc' one, properly tiie concern of government which, they claimed,
had a duty to provide for its citizens what they coitid not acquire by themselves.

Much of this thesis is concerned with explaining exactly how a polincaUy and
economically unimportant band of provincial businessmen succeeded in establishing and
sustaining a long term relationship with the government of New South Wales. Without that
relationship their coal policy would have remained nothing more than an idea. Only the credit
and authority of the Colonial government, which aUowed it to bortow private capital in London
for pubUc works in New South Wales, gave the businessmen any chance of securing their coal
port.
The government's role in the restmcturing of the Wollongong economy was not the
outcome of any settied or prospective economic poUcy of its own. Rather, it was the inabUity
of Ministries to control ParUament which aUowed WoUongong's businessmen to draw them
into a relationshipfi-omwhich they found it difficult to extricate themselves. In the period
under study ParUamentary poUtics was conducted not by parties but by factions. The latter, in
contrast to parties, coalesced around prominent individual leaders, did not lead a continuous
existence and, until the free trade versus protection debate of the late 1880s, were
undifferentiated by ideology. Factions provided a focus for Parliamentary activity. However,
individual factions were never numerically large enough to sustain Ministries, which were'
usuaUy pieced together in complex factional deals. The situation was further compUcated by tiie
presence of independent Members whose uncertain support was at times aU that separated
Ministries from poUtical life or death. In such finely balanced simations, a weU organised and
highly motivated extra Parliamentary group, controlling pubUc poUcy and the pubUc in its
electorate, was capable of deUvering friendly Members to faction leaders and doing other
political favours for Ministries.
The definitive work on the faction system in New South Wales remains that of Peter
Loveday and AUan Martin,'' which provides one of the main secondary sources for tiie present
work. Indeed, without their exhaustive analysis of division Usts, electoral poUtics and the rise
and faU of Ministries, many of the statements upon which parts of this thesis rest could have

P. Loveday & A.W. Martin, Parliament Factions and Parties: The First Thirty Years of R
Government in New South Wales, 1856-1889. Melbourne University Press: Carlton, Victoria
also: A.W. Martin, 'The Legislative Assembly of New South Wales, 1856-1900'. Australian Journa
Politics and History, 2(1), November 1956; P.Loveday & A.W. Martin, 'Colonial Politics Before 1
In P. Loveday, A.W. Martin & R.S. Parker (Eds), The Emergence of the Australian Party Sys
& Iremonger Sydney 1977, and P. Loveday, A.W. Martin & P. Weller, 'New South Wales'. In ibid.
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been arrived at only after prohibitively labour intensive research. They have claimed that one of
the main supports of faction politics was the economic fragmentation of New South Wales
before the end of the nineteenth century.^ However, this proposition was not tested by
Loveday and Martin, whose focus was the electoral and ParUamentary system of the Colony.
This thesis does test tiie claim, by examining in detail the attempt of the businessmen of
WoUongong to estabUsh a coal trade in tiieir district between tiie 1850s and the 1880s. It is also
one of tiie very few studies of economic development in this period to examine in some detaU
the role of government and its relationship with business at the district or regional level.^
This assumes particular importance given tiiat one of the major features of capitaUsm in
New South Wales at that time was its regional character. CapitaUsm had not evolved to the
point where the econoniic life of the Colony began to be dominated by influential individual
owners of capital or large corporations. There were influential capitaUsts and companies but, as
this thesis wiU show, their capacity to determine government poUcy was heavUy conditioned by
regional business interests. In a 1972 article on the history of government raUway poUcy, P.N.
Lamb identified this as a feature of the nineteenth century AustraUan experience which required
closer investigation,'"' To this author's knowledge. Lamb's caU has not been heeded. Yet it
was this regional capitaUsm, as it may be termed, which provided one of the main supports of
the system of faction poUtics. Its natiural poUtical expression was at one extreme tiie infamous
'roads and bridges' Member whose inteUecmal and ideological horizons did not extend much
beyond tiie boundaries of his electorate."' "• At its best it produced the factions which gave the
ParUamentary system tiie cohesion which aUowed it to operate effectively, providing a number
of basic but unprofitable services required for the continued good health of a maturing capitaUst
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market society—education, law and order, immigration, transport and communications. In a
society which from the 1850s to the 1880s experienced an almost unintermpted economic
boom, and in place of ideological division was united by a desire for development and material
progress, liberal individualism provided its dominant values and Parliamentary factions
represented the limit of its need for a strong central government. Only with the Colony wide
coUapse of the boom and the accompanying social distress and threats to profit levels and law
and order, did New Soutii Wales market capitalism require a stronger degree of government
regulation to save and revive it, and produce continuous parties to represent the interests of
labour and of the different sectors of capital affected by the coUapse.
UntU that point, if the Wollongong coal trade is taken as a giude, the larger companies
in the regions took Uttie direct interest in electoral poUtics. As long as their basic needs were
being met—an adequately educated and skiUed labour supply and an efficient transport and
communications system—tiiey tended to stay out of direct contact with ParUamentary poUtics at
the local level. Only tiiose mine proprietors with a clear interest in the schemes proposed by
WoUongong's businessmen sought to have themselves elected as the local Member or to
involve themselves in the process of getting a particular individual into the seat
In fact, the coal companies operated independentiy of the ambitions and plans of local
businessmen and of the involvement with them of govemmenL The Wollongong coal
companies had no interest in promoting tiie transformation of tiie local economy. Owners of
capital invested in the WoUongong coalfield simply because they beUeved that the state of
demand in the AustraUan and Asia-Pacific markets was sufficient to return an acceptable rate of
profit on their investment. Employment of mineworkers and the payment of wages were
merely by products of tiiat activity. The first mines on the field were opened before a coal port
was avaUable for use. Indeed, fixim the 1850s aU but two of the companies which commenced
operations in the district did sofromtheir own ocean jetties.
While such jetties were not infrequentiy destroyed or damaged by heavy seas, they
aUowed immediate access to a depth of water which could accommodate vessels capable of
sailing direct to intercolonial and overseas markets. Many shipowners and captains were not
keen to risk their vessels or lives in such conditions and, consequentiy, most of the district's

10
coal continued to be taken to Sydney in smaller coastal vessels. Nonetheless, the continued
presence of the coal companies and their jetties was sufficient evidence oftiieirabUity to operate
profitably from Wollongong. In general the mine proprietors were of the view that iftiielocal
entrepreneurs were able to persuade government to constmct a coal port, that was fine.
However, they also saw that Unking the coalfield to a port might bring other companies to the
district, and whUetiieypaid due respect to notions of free enterprise tiiey had no particular wish
to increase the number of its practitioners in their district
Hence, the relationship that was established between business and government in
WoUongong from the 1850s had littie to do with the coal companies. Rather, their presence
was desired by a coaUtion of local businessmen who used the opportunities provided by faction
politics and inherently weak Ministries to have the latter given them a means of attracting
mining capital to the district
The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that neither the activities of local
businessmen nor of government had any great influence on the decision of owners of capital to
open mines on the WoUongong coalfield. Obviously, without these decisions there would have
been no WoUongong coal trade, but they are to be explained in terms of market conditions,'
expectations of profitability, cost considerations and other factors of conventional industry
location theory,''2 rather than by the manipulation or regulation of these factors by smaU
business and/or government.
These considerations place this thesis in the context of arguments about the nature of
economic development in AustraUa in the second half of the nineteenth century. One method of
answering the question as to why a coal trade was estabUshed in the WoUongong district during
that period would be to focus the argument on the economic factors or forces which led owners
of capital to invest there. A model for such an approach is the 'staple theory' of economic
development, bortowed from Canadian economic historians''^ and applied to the Australian
nineteenth century experience by J.W. McCarty in the 1960s. McCarty proposed an
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explanation for Australia, as a colony of recent settiement without a domestic market sufficient
to sustain large scale manufacturing, tiiat made it a matter of identifying appropriate natural
resources (staples) whose further development as export commodities was conditioned by two
factors:

'the available technology . . . and the state of demand'.'''^

A.L. Lougheed

strengthened this interpretation. Unking AustraUan development more firmly to tiie level of
international trade. ""^ More recentiy, W.A. Sinclair based his account of AustraUa's economic
history on 'a variant of the staple theory of economic growth'.''^ This theory ran counter to that
of Noel Butiin, who suggested in his major smdy of the AustraUan economy between 1861 and
1900 that, whUe dependent on British capital:
to supplement local AustraUan savings . . . the rate of AustraUan growth was
not intimately dependent on export receipts; and the composition of output
and the rate of growth appear to have been determined predominantly by
local AustraUan considerations.'''^
Happily, elements of both theories fit tiie case of the WoUongong coal trade. The long
economic boom and accelerated population growth experienced by the AustraUan Colonies
following the gold mshes of the 1850s and which persisted untU the coUapse of the 1890s,
required energy to sustain them. Coal rich New South Wales was virtuaUy the only suppUer.''^
At tiie same time, the expanding activities of the great European maritime powers in the AsiaPacific region added to the puU of market forces on the coal resources of the Colony. UntU the
1880s the mining capitaUsts who decided to take WoUongong coal into diose markets were aU
AustraUan based, almost aU in Sydney. British mining capital did not begin to make its way on
to tiie coalfield untU tiie late 1880s,
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McCarty's staple theory was also criticised by J.P. Fogarty, who condemned it along
with any theory that made technical factors such as markets, costs and technology the
determinants of economic development, as having littie abiUty to 'of themselves provide a
sufficient explanation of why particular industries were established in different regions at
particular times'."'^ He concluded his smdy of the AustraUan wheat industry in the second half
of tiie nineteenth century by stating that an adequate answer to such questions must be sought
not only in 'economic and technical factors', but in 'the vital role that the prevailing social and
political institutions and attitudes may have played in influencing tiie choice of staple'.2°
Fogarty's view has limited appUcation to the development of the WoUongong coal trade.
That Wollongong coal lay undisturbed for over half a cenmry foUowing its discovery by
Europeans in 1797 was the result not only of geographic and technological factors, but of a
poUtical arrangement giving a single company, the AustraUan Agricultural Company, a legal
monopoly over the Colony's coal industry. However, when that monopoly was withdrawn the
WoUongong trade grew slowly and cannot be said to have accelerated untU the late 1870s—
something which can be accounted for only by reference to 'economic' factors.
On the question of how, when and by whom a natural resource is recognised as a
marketable commodity and then developed as such, Fogarty's criticism of technical
explanations may have some small contribution to make in explaining the WoUongong coal
trade. Local businessmen took every opportunity to promote the quaUty of Wollongong coal,
particularly in Sydney and in Melboume, the single largest export market for New South Wales
coal in the period under smdy. Their leaders wrote tfrelessly to newspapers, shipping
companies and manufacturers both defending and extoUing the steam generating qualities of
their coal. The influence of such activity in generating awareness of the Wollongong coalfield
and thus investment is impossible to gauge accurately. In addition, tiieir strenuous efforts to
obtain a harbour for the district may have exerted some influence on investors. Again, this
cannot be calculated, but given that owners of capital were looking for at least medium term
returns, the extent to which tiiey were swayed by tiie possibUity of local businessmen obtaining
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a first rate coal port for a provincial town was Ukely to have been a minor consideration, if
considered at alL
The only political factor working unambiguously in favour of the development of tiie
Wollongong coalfield was the absence of any regulation of investment by the Colonial
government The demand for New South Wales coal was being met and could have continued
to be so by the Newcastie coalfield alone. Indeed, the expansion of tiie WoUongong trade only
added to the industry's chronic capacity for overproduction, marked by the coUapse of several
local companies in the downturns of tiie mid 1860s, 1870 and the 1890s. A Uberal capitaUst
Parliament untarnished by salaried Members until 1890 and thus dominated by men of
independent means.^l could not even conceive of placing restrictions on investment. Anyone
with sufficient capital could open a coal mine, regardless of the fact that the potential for
disaster in the industry's abiUty to overproduce was weU understood by the authorities from at
least tiie 1870s.
Despite this liberal individuaUst reluctance to regulate investment, the governments of
the AustraUan Colonies played a significant role in economic development in the boom decades
foUowing the gold mshes, significantiy larger than in other capitaUst economies. One estimate'
for the period states that 'the relative role of govemment in AustraUa in gross capital formation
was over nine times as great as the share of govemment in America'.22 Between 1860 and
1900 Australian governments accounted for half of aU capital imported into the Colonies and
about 40 per cent, of domestic capital formation, almost aU of it in the areas of transport and
communications.23 The apparent novelty of such a large pubUc sector share of economic
activity led some contemporaries to dub it 'colonial socialism', a term not discarded by
twentieth century economic historians such as Noel Butiin. For Butiin, writing in 1959,
colonial sociaUsm was marked by:
positive govemment intervention, with the central feature of large-scale
outiays for capital formation . . . and . . . a . . . pattern of partnership
between govemment and private institutions to which the Australian
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economy was subject for most of the second half of the nineteenth
century-^"^
Butiin, cortectiy, did not press the claim to sociaUst forms of market intervention by the
Colonial governments. As he noted in a more recent study, it was the limited capacity of tiie
private sector to deliver imports of labour and capital sufficient to generate high rates of
economic growth that induced the former to press govemment to 'assume the role of
accelerating these transfers'.25

Far from being a doctrinaire approach to economic

development, ButUn stated, colonial sociaUsm was rather 'an ad hoc solution to the problem of
developing local resources in the face of considerable physical difficulties'.26 That is, not
having experienced an industrial revolution of its own to allow capital accumulation sufficient
for major domestic economic development the Australian private sector was compeUed to
bortow from a society which had—Britain. Hence, as ButUn points out private interests
accepted a relatively high level of govemment involvement in the economy 'because this direct
intervention was perceived as predominantiy . . . supportive of rather than displacing or
impeding major private interests'.2^
Thus it was sociaUsm only in the most general sense of govemment being involved in.,
the direction of economic activity. The concern of government was to sustain private activity
through capital formation in essential sectors of the economy that were unlikely to return an
acceptable rate of profit, if any, on the investment Such undertakings (mainly roads, bridges,
ports, raUways and telegraphs) were therefore designated as 'public' and their cost socialised
through appropriations of government revenue and/or loans. Only in that restricted sense was
the economic intervention of Colonial governments sociaUst.
Butiin's notion of a 'partnership' between government and the private sector has been
criticised, particularly by left wing economic historians such as Ken Buckley and Ted
Wheelwright. They see it as 'misleading', implying that 'the state was an independent force in
its own right, tiiat it chose to aUy itself with private interests and could presumably break away
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from them if govemment felt so inclined'. A capitalist state in a capitalist society, stated
Buckley and Wheelwright, had neither the inclination nor the means of doing so.28 Andrew
Wells' recent and detailed smdy of capitalism in the eastern Australian Colonies in the
nineteenth century lends support to such a view.29 Nonetheless, the New South Wales coal
trade presents a case where both Butiin and his critics have something to contribute to an
explanation of the economic role of govemment
Undeniably, the coal trade was conducted upon capitalist lines. However, the
Newcastle and WoUongong coal trades were not treated simUarly by govemment As this
thesis wUl show, Newcastle developed ahead of WoUongong because of geographic factors
which made the northern coal far easier to exploit. From that point huge sums of pubUc money
were poured into the development of Newcastle Harbour as a major coal port.

This

complemented the inflow of private mining capital, which took advantage of the natural setting
andpubUc spending on export faciUties. To tiiis extent a 'partnership' between the pubUc and
private sectors was forged. The WoUongong coalfield was a different proposition. There the
coal companies made their own way with very Uttie public support. When govemment did
involve itself in attempts to develop that district's coal trade, it did so in no sense of
partnership. Rather, through electoral manipulation govemment was effectively hijacked, not
by major private interests, but by a tight knit group of provincial entrepreneurs, and compeUed
to yield public money for an exercise in economic speculation.
That compulsion provided the basis on which the New South Wales govemment
invested, between 1860 and 1889, well over £1 mUUon of public money in a coal port for
Wollongong and in a raUway to link tiie coalfield with Sydney Harbour, The coal port was too
small to make Wollongong a major player in the Colony's coal trade, but the SydneyWoUongong raUway was a different matter. Newcastie coal proprietors and business interests
beUeved that the latter, by giving the WoUongong mines access to a world class port, threatened
tiie destmction of their trade by flooding the market with cheap, high quaUty southern steaming
coal. The pastoralists of the Colony also felt tiireatened, seeing the construction of such an
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expensive 'branch Une' as a disturbing departure from the settied policy of continuing to push
the main tmnk Unes into the interior so as to lower the cost of transporting wool to Sydney.
The result was a regional economic straggle, with WoUongong's businessmen fighting vainly
against two of the Colony's most powerful groups. Each competed vigorously to gain control
of both the Ministry and the ParUament in order to ensure that its private interests became pubUc
policy and were enforced as such. Thus, Butiin's concept of partnership, whUe appropriate for
describing the settied relationship of govemment with pastoraUsts over raUway poUcy, and with
Newcastle coal proprietors and business interests over harbour policy, broke down when
challenged by another group whose interests were not being met by such arrangements.
Thus, the nature of government's involvement in the economy cannot be accounted for
on the simple basis of a partnership, however understood, with the private sector. In an era
when capitaUsm had not yet matured and the Colony's economy was fragmented by regional
interests the private sector had many faces, any one of which might turn aggressive if its needs
were not being met or, indeed, if its interests were threatened by govemment Although its role
was essentially to fashion 'general and abstract . , . laws [which] . . . would respect and
safeguard tiie market's autonomy and capacity for self-regulation',^0 the nineteenth century
Uberal state offered no guarantees to particular players in the market. The market was inviolate
but there always remained the potential for govemment to intervene in its operation, either to
regulate the behaviour of individuals and companies and/or to promote one set of interests as
against another set That is, neither ParUamentary enactments nor existing market arrangements
were immutable: 'there is a danger that new legislation may destroy vested rights or disturb the
holders of such rights in their peaceable and unrestricted enjoyment of tiiem'.^"" This was
precisely what WoUongong's nineteenth century businessmen were about Their objective was
always to gain access to the political process in order to have govemment, through public
expenditure, grant them a market position which they could not attain by themselves.
At one level, then, the argument in this thesis lends support to the pluraUst conception
of the modem state, seeing it as subject to *a competition among divided interests with the
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stmggle for factional advantage resulting in a poUtical equiUbrium'.32 ^g the tiiesis wUl show,
govemment in nineteenth century New South Wales did operate at the centre of what Max
Weber and other theorists of pluralism might have called a 'multi-dimensionaUty of power'.^^
However, that plurality of power was planted firmly within a capitaUst market economy which
was not itself a matter for negotiation.
Even so, the executive of the Colonial state was not merely, in the famous formulation
of Marx and Engels, 'but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole
bourgeoisie'.'^'^ At the most fundamental level this was so, tiie government as already noted,
seeing to the provision of a range of basic services and being heavily involved in capital
formation. However, colonial society was economicaUy complex enough for deep conflicts of
interests to arise, requiring govemment, as Buckley and Wheelwright put i t to 'perform a
balancing act' in deciding whose interests would be protected or promoted.^^ WhUe these
conflicts did not place capitaUsm itself at risk, they did, as Buckley and Wheelwright
recognised, give govemment 'some autonomy in decision making'.^6 That limited autonomy,
though, could itself become the target of decision making by private interests.
The New South Wales govemment was certainly the target of WoUongong's
businessmen. With rare determination they pressed their case, over decades, for pubUc
expenditure on export faciUties for tiie WoUongong coalfield. If their actual contribution to the
estabUshment of a coal trade in the district along with that of government was at best
peripheral, there was one area in which they were undeniably and unambiguously successful.
Once the businessmen decided that WoUongong must be a mining and manufacturing
centre, they embarked on a cmsade to persuade the local population to support their vision of
the district's future. Their success was evidenced by their abiUty to mobiUse the inhabitants to
sign petitions, attend pubUc meetings and support the various organisations created by the
businessmen, in order to impress Ministries and Parliaments with the legitimacy of their
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requests that public money should be devoted to the attainment of their private ends. The
businessmen were driven by a desire, indeed an obsession, for a constantly rising level of
material prosperity. They were open about this, but were always concerned to situate their
motive within the context of tiie very highest values of British UberaUsm, delighting in tiie
individual liberty and choice to be enjoyed in a market society and dedicating their
entrepreneurial capacities to the attainment of an era of material affluence in which aU
individuals could enjoy life in abundance. In the end, however, it all resolved itself into a
campaign to use pubUc resources to achieve private ends—in this case a pubUc port designed to
create a coal trade which, the businessmen hoped, would fUl to overflowing die tUls of local
business houses.
This view of the social and economic role of nineteenth century AustraUan businessmen
is at odds with some recent attempts to demonstrate that tiiey were in fact moved by high ideals
of community responsibiUty. Thus, Geoffrey Ciur, writing about Melboume businessmen and
suburban development between 1870 and 1890, accounted for tiieir dealings with govemment
over railway building as being motivated by their liberal ideals rather than by 'sordid,
materialistic, and often dishonest' business practices or 'speculative mania'.^7 This effort to
rescue the reputation of AustraUa's entrepreneurs was echoed by Stevan Eldred-Grigg in his
study of 'moral capitaUsm' among landowners in the Hunter Valley region of New South
Wales."^^ Both Cuir and Eldred-Grigg had answered Alan Birch's complaint that
in Australia there has been very Uttie expression of pride in the activities of
this country's pioneers in extending settiement and the exploitation of the
antipodean continent's rich natural resources.^^
The activities and aims of WoUongong's nineteenth century businessmen may be adduced as
one reason for that lack of pride. They were motivated by money, pure and simple. In fact,
they provided a striking instance of Donald Home's observation, in his study of the impact of
economic values on AustraUan society, that
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The 'radiant, mysterious, dangerous' principle of money can move
AustraUans deeply, providing some of the most subUme values and symbols
of social order and much of tiie meaning of individual Uves."^
There was, and is, nothing uniquely Australian about this. Nonetheless, within the
WoUongong district in the near 40 years of economic buoyancy between the gold mshes and
the coUapse of the 1890s, there is no doubt that the dominant values were an extreme form of
Uberal individualism. The outiook that defined the aim and purpose of its community was an
increasingly strident beUef that material progress, prosperity and the pursuit of individual gain
were ends of the highest social value, if not the only means by which the good society could be
achieved. Of course, those who had settied in WoUongong before the 1850s as farmers and
employers of agricultural labour, or as providers of commercial and professional services, did
so with the intention of drawing a profitable Uving from the district. However, after April
1857, when one of the wealthiest men in the Colony commenced tiie export of coal from the
coalfield's first major mine, tiiere was an edge to public discussion of the district's economic
future that had previously been absent. A self appointed eUte emerged which took hold of
public policy in an attempt to engineer a particular kind of economic sttucture for the district It
was they, the local businessmen, who formed organisations dedicated to the attainment of that
objective and, consequentiy, it was their values and aspirations which held sway in the district.
They were sufficiently weU organised and motivated to carry the rest of the inhabitants with
them. Thus, the district's major newspaper, the Ulawarra Mercury, was less a journal of pubUc
record than a mechanism for restmcturing the minds and aspirations of its readers, and the
minute book of the business eUte which spoke for WoUongong.^''
Exactly why WoUongong's leaders had such faitii in pecuniary gain and valued it so
highly is beyond the scope of this tiiesis. The point at which Westem societies estabUshed the
principle of individual gain as the core of economic life and the guiding principle of human
nature, or as the American economic historian Robert HeUbroner put it, created '"economic
40
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man"—a pale wraith of a creature who foUows his adding-machine brain wherever it leads
him','^^ occurred as part of the great transition from feudal/pre industrial society to capitalist
market society. However, the circumstances which propeUed WoUongong's businessmen along
that path can be established. The farming economy of the district was battered severely in the
depression of the 1840s and, when recovery came, largely under the impems of the gold
rushes, it only restored things to about their pre depression level. At the same time the
economies of tiie gold bearing regions and of the Colonies of Victoria and New South Wales
generally were expanding as tiie influx of gold seekers and immigrants created new internal
markets. The impact of the mshes on AustraUan economy and society was enormous.
However, as Humphrey McQueen has emphasised:
Their effect, and this is the central point was on social consciousness.
They sustained the beUef that advancement was possible, that the smaU man
could make good, that capitaUsm was not without promise.'*^
The consciousness of the small men of WoUongong was profoundly affected by the fact
that other districts and regions were forging ahead whUe tiieir own, far from the action,
remained relatively static. Once, though, coal emerged as a means by which a new population
of wage earners and their families might be brought to the district, it became their gold
equivalent and tiiey pledged themselves to the creation of as large a coal trade as the coalfield
could sustain.
While their efforts had Uttie, ultimately, to do with the estabUshment of a coal trade in
WoUongong, they had everything to do with the creation of an industrial mentaUty in the town
and district. An understanding of this process contributes much to explaining the origins of a
major twentieth century industrial centre, and why the inhabitants of tiie district especially its
business leaders, shared a set of values consistent with the encouragement of economic growth
and expansion at almost any price.'^ Those values have come under increasing question and
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challenge in the late twentieth century, as the pursuit of industrial growth has bequeathed a
legacy of major environmental problems and deep social ones arising from levels of
unemployment and povertytiiatit was meant to banish.'^
The argument in tiie thesis is organised in three parts. Part I, comprising Chapters 1 to
5, inclusive, examines the period 1849-1871. It estabUshes tiie factors leading to the location
of tiie first mines on tiie WoUongong coalfield, as weU as to tiie formation of tiie coaUtion of
local businessmen that had as its object the attraction to the district of as much mining capital as
it could absorb. They identified the lack of a namral harbour as the great obstacle to the
attainment of that objective and, through electoral manipulation, succeeded in having the New
South Wales govemment constmct a coal port at pubUc expense. The port was completed in
1868, but proved a grand failure. Owners of capital responded to market and profit
considerations rather than to the efforts of smaU business to overcome such considerations with
artificial inducements provided at public expense. Consequently, by 1871, following
recessions in 1863/64 and 1870, only a handful of mines were operating in the Wollongong
coalfield
Part II, containing Chapters 6 to 10, inclusive, deals with the response of the
businessmen to the failure of their Wollongong Harbour poUcy. InitiaUy demoralised and
confused, they soon formulated a new variant of their poUcy—a raUway linking the coalfield
with Sydney Harbour, 50 mUes to the north. This was a vastiy more expensive proposition
than a smaU coal port located in WoUongong. At fu"st it attracted no support from govemment,
which prompted the businessmen to sound out investors in Sydney with a view to forming a
private company which would buUd and operate the Une. That too faUed to materiaUse.
From being merely the idea of a band of provincial speculators, the SydneyWoUongong raUway became a major pubUc policy issue following a period of accelerated
growth in the economies of the Australian Colonies from 1872. As tiie demand for coal
expanded, several Sydney investor-politicians acquired coal properties in and around the
Wollongong district Together with the district's businessmen they worked to convince
Sydney manufacturing and commercial interests of the benefits of cheaper coal and an
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expansion of the export trade of the metropolis. This coaUtion took the proposal before the
Parliament on two occasions, in 1876 and 1878, only to be defeated by a more powerful
coaUtion comprising Newcastie coal proprietors and business interests, and the pastoralists of
the interior who beUeved tiiat the £1 miUion sought for the niawarra Railway would be better
appUed to the extension of existing lines to the wool producing regions of the Colony.
Complex factional manoeuverings within the ParUament also contributed to those defeats.
The Railway wasfinallysanctioned by Parliament in 1881. This was less the result of a
change of heart by the regional interests which had seen to its rejection in 1876 and 1878, tiian
of the need of Sydney business interests to secure ParUamentary support for a greatiy expanded
programme of railway construction which required the raising of pubUc loans in Britain on a
scale unprecedented in the Colony's history. The object was to retain for Sydney the impetus
to trade and commerce given by the Colony's wool export trade with Britain. That impetus had
been progressively weakened by governments in the neighbouring Colonies of Victoria and
South Australia whose railways, linked to the inland rivers of New South Wales, were
deUvering an increasing proportion of the latter's wool cUp to their own merchant, maritime and
commercial interests. With vutuaUy every interest in the Colony guaranteed something in the
new raUway programme, including Newcastie which was also to be connected to Sydney, the
Ulawarra RaUway obtained ParUamentary approval.
Following that approval the Wollongong coal trade underwent a period of relatively
rapid expansion. That period, 1882-1889, is treated in Chapter 11, which is also Part HI of tiie
thesis. V/hether the expansion of the coal trade owed anything to the line is questionable.
Some companies may have been lured totiiecoalfield by the option of being able to ship their
coal direct to intercolonial and overseas markets from one of the world's fmest harbours.
However, only one company, the MetropoUtan, located inland at tiie northern extreme of the
WoUongong district, railed aU of its output to Sydney. Every other new company constmcted
ocean jetties. RaUway haulage costs over the escarpment and through theraggednorthern part
of the district did not aUow the line to compete with the sea routes. The expansion that occurred
in the WoUongong coal trade in the 1880s was not the outcome of the development poUcy of
local businessmen or of pubUcly funded transport infrastracture.
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That however, was of no consequence to the businessmen. What mattered was that the
district now possessed a coal trade worthy of the name. Sydney and Wollongong were not
linked by rail untU 1888, a measure of the constmction difficulties involved. As the Unk neared
completion, the attention of WoUongong's businessmen centred on the consequences for the
business houses of the town of having the district's major coal port located 50 miles away. In
order to secure for those business houses the trade of a busy maritime centre, they developed a
third variant of their policy—^the Wollongong Harbour Tmst
The Trast was to be a semi statutory authority, vested with the power, backed by an Act
of ParUament, to bortow up to £250,000 in London for the purpose of constracting a major
new port at WoUongong, with every mine connected to it by the Ulawarta Railway. The Parkes
Govemment pushed the Wollongong Harbour Trast Act through the ParUament in 1889,
handing over control of the existing public port and the WoUongong seaboard to a body
dominated by local businessmen. However, this represented less a victory for the businessmen
than a move by the govemment to reduce the pubUc debt, which had risen to record levels. The
Wollongong Harbour Tmst was in fact an experiment by the Parkes Govemment in the partial
privatisation of 'pubUc' works. If it succeeded, other regional ports in the Colony would
similarly be weaned from direct dependence on the pubUc sector.
The innovation proved abortive, the Trast being consumed by the economic coUapse of
the 1890s. Appropriately, the businessmen's Harbour Trast was a victim of the results of the
speculative pubUc bortowing excesses of the 1870s and, particularly, tiie 1880s, undertaken to
satisfy the private ambitions of regional economic interests like those in Wollongong. The
scheme saw them at the zenith of their power, with direct control over port constraction and the
regulation of maritime activity in the WoUongong district. Like all their other plans it proved
iUusory; the shaping of the coal trade had never been in their grasp. Like the coal they wanted
to see mined in great quantities, their objectives had to await the decisions of owners of capital
to invest in the district. And those decisions were made by people outside their control, who
themselves were moved by forces and expectations that had littie to do with anything tiiat
occmred in WoUongong.

